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Project governance has been recognized as a critical factor to the success of project delivery in practice. Accordingly, this research aims to
demonstrate that the notion of risk-bearing capacity (RBC) can be drawn upon as a new dimension to the analysis and design of project
governance. An effort is made to link this concept with the deﬁnitions of governance employed within the literature of transaction cost economics
and corporate governance. The RBC approach distinguishes itself from extant views of project governance through its ability to quantitatively
integrate organizational (e.g., delivery system), contractual (e.g., risk-sharing ratio) and ﬁnancial (e.g., insurance cover) measures. This novel
approach provides an avenue for incorporating the project's historical construction and operating data into the design of project governance; an
advantage with the potential to exponentially increase as a torrent of digital data is made available through the deployment of emergent information
technologies (e.g. building information modelling).
© 2015 The Author. Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction tradition by developing a quantitative approach to the study ofProject governance is increasingly acknowledged as a critical
factor for the successful delivery of construction projects (HM
Treasury, 2007).Whereas the root of “governance” can be traced to
the Latin word “gubernare” (meaning: steering) (Müller, 2010),
this term was not popularly used within social sciences literature
until the last two decades (Dixit, 2009). The prevalent acceptance
of this term is primarily attributed to the development of
organizational economics in general and Oliver Williamson's
transaction cost economics (TCE) in particular. As reviewed
by Biesenthal and Wilden (2014), these approaches (TCE and
agency theory) are influential in shaping the way project
governance is analyzed within project management literature
(Müller, 2009, 2010; Müller and Turner, 2005; Winch, 2001).
The current state of project governance literature is qualitative
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ghtsproject governance. There are two reasons for seeking a
complementary theoretical foundation: First, organizational
economics is normally developed within the context of
generic organizational forms (e.g., market, hierarchy, hybrid)
with characteristics distinct from project organizations, so
resorting to more rudimentary principles of governance as the
starting point of theorization could provide a new frontier for the
study of project governance. Second, both TCE and agency
theory are formalizable (Gibbons, 2005a), and taking any step
towards this end could exploit their modelling power to a greater
extent.
In seeking a new dimension for the study of project governance,
this research probes the fundamental function that governance
structures are supposed to serve within TCE. Whilst Williamson
defines governance structure in fairly broad terms, in its application
the definition must be modified to accommodate context-specific
subtleties. Corporate governance is chosen as a focus application
area for exploration because of its strong influence on prior studies
of project governance. In principle, the central role of governance
structures is to maintain the order of transactions. In the course ofreserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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opportunism-induced behavioural uncertainty. How to efficiently
manage risks should be placed in the center of project governance
design. In current construction practice, three types of means are
commonly employed to manage risks. Organizationally, the choice
of delivery systems (e.g., traditional procurement, relational
contracting) could change the intensity of behavioural uncertainty
(Ive and Chang, 2007). Contractually, the choice of contract forms
(e.g., lump-sum, cost-plus) can shift risk exposure between parties
(Smith et al., 2006). Financially, the use of financial protection
(e.g., bonding, insurance) can reduce a project's overall risk
exposure. How to efficiently manage transactional hazards through
these three means is the overarching issue in the design of project
governance. This research maintains that the concept of
risk-bearing capacity can provide a coherent basis for integrating
the decisions of the three means and thus shed new light on the
analysis of project governance. This assertion is substantiated by a
mathematical model that allows the choice of optimal risk-sharing
ratio and insurance decisions to be determined simultaneously. A
great benefit of the risk-bearing capacity approach (hereafter the
RBC approach) lies in the ability to harness project lifecycle data
(costs, risks and financial protections) to inform upon the design of
project governance. The strength of this approach in quantifiability
will grow significant as enormous new data becomes available
resulting from the proliferation of building information modelling
(BIM) and sensory instruments. The study of project governance
is, in itself, a bona fide multidisciplinary undertaking (Söderlund,
2004) and it is hoped that the theoretical contribution of this
research towards the development of the RBC approach can
provide an alternative to the design of project governance. Whilst
this research focuses on the context of projects involving a large
fixed lump-sum investment (i.e., capital projects), the arguments
can be readily applied to the analysis of other types of projects (i.e.,
IT projects).
Introductions aside, this paper contains five sections. In
Section 2, the existing studies of project governance are reviewed
so as to underscore the existence of a knowledge gap in the lack
of a quantitative alternative to project governance analysis. A
comprehensive approach is taken by revisiting the way governance
structures are originally defined within TCE literature and in what
ways they have been adapted in applications to corporate
governance research. In Section 3, an attempt is made to illuminate
the potential of the RBC approach as a keystone for project
governance analysis through the exposition of its theoretical
underpinnings, the problems it can address, and its feasibility in
integrating procurement decisions. Section 4 provides a discussion
of the significance and implications of the new approach. A
concluding section follows.
2. Literature review
2.1. Prior studies on project governance
As evidenced in the upcoming special issue on project
governance in this journal, governance issues provide a
vibrant research area. Following the OECD's definition of
corporate governance (Organisation for Economic CooperationDevelopment, 2004), project governance is normally defined as
“the structure through which the objectives of the project are set,
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined” (p.311) (Turner, 2009). Some-
times, project governance also cover the organizational issues
arising in the interface between project and parent organization
(e.g., Project Management Office), and within the parent
organization of the project investor (corporate governance)
(Winch, 2014). The approaches employed in the analysis of
project governance are as diverse as the study of organizations
itself, including agency theory, transaction cost economics,
shareholder theory and resource dependency theory (Biesenthal
and Wilden, 2014). Of them, only the works drawing on agency
theory and TCE are directly relevant to the current research.
Since the 1980s, the potential of TCE has been recognized
by project management researchers (see Chang and Chou
(2014) for a review). Two types of TCE applications should be
distinguished: one stream draws on the concept of transaction
costs in forming part of the explanation (e.g.,van den Hurk and
Verhoest (2014)) whilst the other attempts to build a TCE based
theory of project organizations. The former by far outnumbers
the latter within existing literature, seemingly owed to TCE's
ability to exist alongside other arguments. Whilst synthesis can
enrich a multidisciplinary research field, being content with ad
hoc applications of TCE arguments could inhibit the advance-
ment of theoretical understanding. Among the few theorizing
attempts, Winch (2001) builds on TCE to analyze the choice of
both horizontal governance (for transactions between the owner
and her suppliers) and vertical governance (for transactions
between first-tier contractors and subcontractors down the
supply chain) in construction. He maintains that the arrangement
of traditional design-bid-construction systems can be seen as
Williamson's ‘trilateral governance’ since the designer assumes
the role of control actor in charge of verifying performance,
facilitating negotiations, and assisting in dispute resolutions. This
paper expounds the concept of ‘professional governance’ to
capture the key features of traditional procurement systems,
including the separation of design from construction (with the
effect of mitigating ex post opportunism), standardized intangibil-
ity of the service (ensuring the owner knows how services will be
delivered), performance default remedy supported by the profes-
sional institution (e.g., Institute of Civil Engineers), unlimited
personal liability of the designer, and high reputational damages
at risk in the event of sub-performance. Contracts can achieve
“hierarchical effects” by specifying authority systems, providing
incentive systems, using administered pricing systems, providing
conflict resolution procedures, and standardized operating proce-
dures. As regards the governing of supply chains, the contractor is
advised to choose one of four generic governance structures
(sequential spot market, quasi-firm, consortium, joint venture) on
the basis of asset specificity and frequency. Whilst Winch (2001)
is soundly grounded in the TCE framework of ‘make or buy’
decisions, it is worth noting that the evolution of TCE has been
influenced by the experience of antitrust law enforcement
(Williamson, 1996). This is why the main interests of TCE
exist on the polar types of governance (market and hierarchy).
When it comes to the governance decisions of ‘permanent’
Table 1
Definitions of corporate governance in the economics literature.
Reference Definition
Eells (1960) The structure and functioning of the corporate polity
Hart (1995) A mechanism for making decisions that have not been specified
in the initial contract
Shleifer and
Vishny
(1997)
The ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment
Zingales
(1998)
Governance system as the complex set of conditions that shape
the outcome of the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents that
are generated in the course of a relationship
John and
Senbet
(1998)
Mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise
control over corporate insiders and management such that their
interests are protected
Tirole (2001) The design of institutions that induce or force management to
internalize the welfare of stakeholders
Becht et al.
(2003)
A problem involving an agent – the CEO of the corporation – and
multiple principals — the shareholders, creditors, suppliers,
owners, employees, and other parties with whom the CEO
engages in business on behalf of the corporation
(Hermalin
(2013))
The product of decisions in many dimensions: board structure,
security design, incentive schemes and the like
Source: this research.
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Winch's framework is instrumental. Not so in the analysis of
‘temporary’ organizations, where instead of being confined to the
TCE framework, there is benefit in developing a customized
theory of project governance on the basis of more rudimentary
principles of governance design.
Floricel andMiller (2001) provide another theorizing attempt.
The authors argue that in the planning and implementation of
large-scale projects, a project should seek ‘robustness’ in the
planning stage to immunize performance from environmental
disturbances and enhance ‘governability’ by improving cohesion
(project participants' willingness to stay with the project and
solve the problems caused by disturbances), resources (financial
reserves to cope), flexibility (ability to restructure the project
itself) and generativity (ability to develop creative responses).
Whereas potentially these dimensions can provide useful
guidance for the design of project governance, further effort
should be made to operationalize their content.
The highly influential agency approach also has impacts upon
the study of project governance.Müller and Turner (2005) attempt
to discern the conditions under which relational contracts, alliance
contracts, and conventional contracts would be more suitable in
terms of business culture (trust based v.s. transaction based) and
business challenges (simple v.s. complex). Evidently, a discrete
classification system can differentiate project governance types in
a compact way. However, in practice the demarcation between
them can be blurred and thus there could be a need to
“decompose” project governance into key elements for analytical
purposes.
There is no denying that the vibrant development of project
governance literature and the diversity of perspectives bodes well
for its future. Nonetheless, in terms of sophistication, depth, rigor,
and consistency by which the progress of a research field is
judged (Durisin and Puzone, 2009), there is little sign that project
governance research is catching up with the advanced field
of governance study (e.g., corporate governance research).
Case studies are overly relied upon in substantiating conceptual
constructs, and attempts should therefore be made to operationalize
the terms to make them measurable and to “harden” research
methods towards the establishment of evidence via rigorous
hypothesis testing. This research represents an attempt towards
these ends.
2.2. Prior studies on governance and corporate governance
The popular use of “governance” in academic writings could
be credited to Oliver Williamson's celebrated works on
transaction cost economics. Williamson defines governance
structure as “the institutional matrix in which the integrity of
a transaction is decided” (p. 378) (Williamson, 1996), which
serves to “provide cost-effective relief against maladaptation
hazards” (p.5) (Williamson, 1996). In the study of governance,
the central issues therefore lie in the “identification, explica-
tion, and mitigation of all forms of contractual hazards” (p.5)
(Williamson, 1996).
In its application, modifications need to be made to the
general definition of governance. Corporate governance is oneof the most studied governance types, with its vast body of
literature providing profuse examples of how to reflect context-
specific factors in the definition of governance (see Table 1).
According to Becht et al. (2003), the term “corporate governance”
dates back to Eells (1960), which defines it as “the structure and
functioning of the corporate polity”. Since the publication of
seminal theoretical works in the 1970's and 1980's (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the rapid growth of
corporate governance literature has justified itself as a field
(Durisin and Puzone, 2009). Since corporations are a dominant
form of business organization in the market economy, a critical
role of corporate governance is to ensure the providers of
corporate funds (shareholders and debt-holders) can attain a good
return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The
influence of the agency approach can be seen in the modelling of
corporate governance as a complex relationship between the
corporation's management and its key stakeholders (Becht et al.,
2003). The second view stresses the functions that corporate
governance is meant to serve, including control (John and Senbet,
1998), capability to adapt in the presence of quasi rents (Zingales,
1998), and the ability to align management's individual interest
with social interest (Tirole, 2001). These functions are
satisfied in practice through the design of board structure,
securities, and incentive schemes (Hermalin, 2013). Collec-
tively, the study of corporate governance is built upon an
understanding of the relationships between key stakeholders,
alignment instruments, and the objectives of governance
design. The variety of corporate governance definitions within
literature attests that the definition of governance should reflect
analytical emphasis. This practice helps liberate thinking from the
confines of the existing project governance framework in order to
develop a new approach.
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In this section, an attempt will be made to explain why the
RBC approach can serve as a feasible framework in prescribing
solutions to the issues involved in the design of project
governance. For this purpose, this section is aimed to answer
three questions: What is the risk-bearing capacity approach?
What issues is this approach suited to address? How feasible is
it in resolving the issues as claimed?
3.1. What is the RBC approach?
The notion of risk-bearing capacity is aimed at measuring
the limit under which the contracting parties could begin
desiring to pull out of, rather than continue, the contract. The
identification of such a cut-off point would better reflect the full
cost of risk bearing and thus improve the design of governance
structure in mitigating the transactional hazards. Quasi rents
can serve as a good measure of risk-bearing capacity (Chang,
2013a,b,c, 2014). By definition, quasi rents refer to the return in
excess of the minimum required for a trader to carry on the
transaction in the post-contract stage (Milgrom and Roberts,
1992). The potential effect of quasi rent on organizational design
was systematically explored for the first time by Klein et al.
(1978). The reasoning is simple: When both parties are locked
into the trading relationship, the party with a greater quasi rent
will appear to be more vulnerable. As such, the magnitude of
appropriable quasi rent can act as a good predictor for the size of
transaction costs (Gibbons, 2005a). This reasoning leads to asset
specificity being identified as the most serious inhibitor to market
efficiency. However, Chang (2013c) presents a variant on the
way quasi rents can be analytically applied by interpreting it as
the limit of the downside risk that one contracting party is willing
to bear before opting out (Chang, 2013a,b). This limit would be
affected by the project governance, contract form and financial
protection used. This new perspective seeks to integrate available
measures by considering the cost of these measures against the
benefits resulting from the improved risk-bearing capacity as a
result of their use. In what follows, an attempt will be made to
show the possible way of incorporating these measures into the
risk-bearing capacity framework.
According to TCE, the general objective of governance
design lies in the efficient use of measures to mitigate the costsTable 2
Key procurement decisions.
Problem Focus
First-order economizing Delivery speed Revenue
First-order economizing Holdup problem Transaction cost
First-order economizing Risk-bearing limit Production/transactio
cost
Second-order
refinements
Moral hazard problem (designer) Production cost
Second-order
refinements
Moral hazard problem (contractor) Production cost
Second-order
refinements
Risk-bearing limit Production/transactio
cost
Source: this research.of maladaptation. It follows that the study of project governance
should be concerned with the employment of most cost-effective
‘means’ to moderate the hazards that would overshadow the
trading relationships between the owner and external project
participants throughout the project lifecycle.
3.2. What issues are the RBC approach suited to address?
This section discusses the issues that can be addressed within
the RBC framework. Project production involves collaboration
between parties with complementary assets (human or physical
capital). The worthiness of a project primarily depends on how
well the procurement process is managed. In practice, there are
three types of means to enable the owner to achieve her project
goals: organizational, financial and contractual (see Table 2).
In TCE, getting the governance structure right is regarded as
the decision of first-order importance in terms of its impact on
efficiency (Williamson, 1996). In construction procurement,
the choice of procurement systems bears the same importance
as this decision determines to what extent the project can be
delivered earlier and the holdup threat can be mitigated (Ive and
Chang, 2007). Delivery speed is mainly determined by how far
design and construction can be overlapped, which in turn depends
on the fragmentation of procurement systems. In this respect,
management system ≻ design-build ≻ traditional method (≻:
superior to). Once the project goes into the post-contract stage,
the owner is gradually locked into this project as her switching
cost increases along with more investments being sunk (Chang
and Ive, 2007). In the event of project disruption, the owner has to
confront tough negotiations with the contractor in order to avoid
incurring switching costs. The level of difficulty for an owner to
place a replacement contractor is a key determinant of her
bargaining weakness post contract. The degree of vulnerability
can be measured by the deviation from the 50:50 split in
negotiations. According to the Nash bargaining model, the owner
would need to concede ground because she has a greater quasi rent
than the contractor in both traditional procurement (Chang, 2012)
and PPP procurement (Chang, 2013a). The holdup threat would
become severe when the owner needs to change requirements ex
post. To mitigate this type of hazard, the procurement system that
allows the sequential tendering of work packages can give the
owner greater flexibility to change at a later stage. In this sense,
management system procurement has a clear advantage overStrategy Type
Get project governance right Organizational
Get project governance right Organizational
n Get financial protection right (e.g. insurances) Financial
Professional governance Institutional
Get risk allocation right Contractual
n Get financial protection right (e.g., performance bonds) Financial
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changes without paying an exorbitant price after the design-build
contract is placed at an early stage. As a result, management
system ≻ traditional method ≻ design-build (≻: superior to) (Ive
and Chang, 2007). The reversal of bargaining power is the origin
of most contracting hazards in construction procurement. To what
extent the owner's vulnerability will be taken advantage of is
actually a probabilistic problem. In recent decades, construction
partnering/alliancing has been promoted as the cure for this hazard
(Infrastructure UK, 2013; Latham, 1994). Partnering is meant to
change project participants' attitude from confrontational to
cooperative in resolving problems. It is hoped that, in the face of
an unforeseen event, the contractor can put mutual objectives
ahead of individual interests by actively seeking a solution rather
than exploiting it as an opportunity for extra gains. From the
perspective of organizational economics, the effect of partnering is
tantamount to enlarging the “self-enforcing” range of the contract
(Klein, 1996; Telser, 1980), thereby reducing the transaction costs
that would be induced by holdup motives.
The third decision of first-order importance is associated with
the use of insurances to improve the financial viability of the
project. In the Gateway review process (Office of Government
Commerce, 2007), it is advisable for the owner at the outset
(Gateway 1: Business Justification) to consider insurances as a
means to reign in risk exposure to an acceptable level. Considering
the above, the longer and more complex the contract the stronger
the demand for insurances. A proper use of insurances could
fundamentally change the feasibility of a project, so it should be
deemed just as important as the decision of procurement strategy.
Governance design should also examine second-order
(marginalist) refinements for moral hazard problems
(Williamson, 1996). In commissioning project works, the
owner faces a fundamental contracting problem in whether
the undertakers will perform at their best. According to
Principal-Agent theory (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987), this
problem arises when, under asymmetric information, the
owner cannot gauge the agent's performance solely by the output.
For instance, good performance may result from flukes and bad
performance may be caused by uncontrollable risk. Given that
“effort” is not contractible, the agent's best effort can only
be elicited. First, as for the designer's motivation, reputation
seems the main driver. However, “professional governance” (in
Winch's term) can perhaps drive the designer to perform design
tasks with due diligence and could not provide the designer with
strong incentives to develop a design scheme that is not only
aesthetically appealing, but also buildable and sustainable.
As for the contractor's motivation, an effective solution is
through choosing a different form of contract. In practice, there
are two common choices: fixed price contract (strong-powered
incentives) and cost plus contract (weak-powered incentives)
(Chang, 2014; Smith et al., 2006). Under the former, the
contractor can retain all the cost savings. If the scope of work
can be clearly defined, this contract provides high-powered
incentives to improve production efficiency (Tadelis, 2012).
Financial instruments can also help achieve second-order
refinements, including bonds (tender bonds, performance bonds),
guarantees (parent company guarantees), andwarranties (collateralwarranties) (Hillebrandt et al., 2002; RICS, 2012). Most of the
major owners require the contractor to have various financial
protections in place. Greater complexity of the project normally
results in financial protection being more intensively used.
For example, in the standardized PF2 contract (HM Treasury,
2013), there are a number of chapters associated with financial
protections, including Chapter 13 (Warranties), Chapter 14
(Indemnities, Guarantees), and Chapter 17 (Insurances).
Compensation on termination for contractor/owner default
also has implications for governance design (Chapter 23–25),
as it can mitigate one party's appropriability hazards arising
from the other party's unilateral action.
Table 2 provides a summary of four principal means used
to align divergent interests between parties within construc-
tion procurement. Of them, only organizational, contractual
and financial measures are under the owner's control. These
decisions should not be treated as solitary decisions as one
could have spill-over effects on others. The first example is
that financial protection may have a bearing upon the efficacy
of organizational means. A performance bond provides the
owner with compensation on the extra expenses in the event of
contractor performance failure. With part of the switching
costs covered, this protection could strengthen the owner's
post-contract bargaining power to curb the contractor's holdup
threat and thus undermine the relative advantage of fragmented
procurement systems over design-build. The second example is the
close connection between procurement system and contract form.
Most design-build projects use lump-sum contracts, whilst
incentive contracts are more likely employed in the projects using
traditional methods. Since three means tend to be utilized in cluster
(i.e. high correlation between the choices of procurement system,
contract form and financial protection), there should be a
complementarity between them (Brynjolfsson and Milgrom,
2013). In a system involving interdependent interactions of sub-
systems, there would be multiple local maxima (Rivkin, 2000).
Project governance possesses some characteristics of this type of
system. Without an integrated approach, the effects of comple-
mentarity and trade-offs among three means would not be fully
scrutinized in crafting the optimal governance structure for a
project.
3.3. A preliminary assessment of the feasibility of the RBC
approach
The cardinal virtue of the RBC approach is its ability to
quantitatively integrate the decisions of three means: organiza-
tional, contractual and financial. Since the incorporation of the
organizational means entails considerable work, the following
demonstration case is chiefly focused on the coupling effect
between the contractual and financial means.
First, the choice of governance structures may greatly affect the
riskiness of the project. In the analysis of discrete governance
structures (Williamson, 1991), the size of anticipated disturbances
is deemed essential for governance choices. In governing
transactions with inconsequential disturbances, the market can
adjust itself and restore efficiency. However, if the transaction
is subject to mid-range disturbances, a contract with highly
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long-term supply contract between the Nevada Power Company
and the Northwest Trading Company (Joskow, 1985, 1988). This
contract contains a price adjustment mechanism to allow for 10%
price change in conjunction with the mechanisms of information
disclosure and dispute resolution. However, for transactions in the
face of highly consequential disturbances, contracting will lose out
to hierarchy as the preferred governance structure in affecting
adaptability. From the perspective of TCE, the optimal governance
choice is closely related to the magnitude of foreseen disturbances.
Actually, the choice of procurement systems (traditional method,
design-build, management system) can change the project's
risk-bearing capacity through three channels: First, the delivery
time can be shortened by increasing the overlap of construction
and design. In doing so, the increase in project net present value as
a result of shorter delivery time can translate into the owner's
buffer for unexpected shocks. The second channel is through
decision rights assignment in order to change the adaptability costs
of project governance. With decision rights, the decision maker
can choose the course of action that maximizes his own interest in
negotiations. However, the downside is it would intensify the other
party's holdup tendency (Arrunada et al., 2001). In Hart and
Holmstrom (2010), the friction in affecting adaptability is captured
by the cost of shading, which could undermine a project's
risk-bearing capacity. Empirically, a recent attempt at modelling
and measuring the adaptability costs of traditional procurement
system with econometric methods would prove a possible path
forward (Bajari et al., 2014). Alternatively, the cost of decision
rights assignment can be evaluated using real options analysis.
Third, workload volatility is the one of the largest operational risks
facing the contractor. For repeat owners who have a programme of
work to carry out, conditioning the award of future work on the
contractor's current performance might not only mitigate holdup
threats, but also attract a discount in bidding prices. The net benefit
of relational procurement can be incorporated into the RBC
framework using either econometric methods or real options
analysis.
Second, contractual arrangements can fundamentally change
the risk impact a project can withstand. The most important
function of the contract is to specify the allocation of payoff
rights between parties. How to allocate risk-bearing ability is
the cornerstone of Principal-Agent theory (Roberts, 2007).
In the agency relationship, transferring risk from the principal
to the agent has a cost. On the one hand, the cost varies with the
agent's risk-bearing ability (represented by his risk attitude
under no wealth constraint); on the other, it is to do with the
riskiness of the transaction (measured by the variation in
payoffs). The principal has to trade off the cost of risk transfer
against the benefit from the agent's additional effort induced
by risk-sharing. As shown in Chang (2014), the concept
of risk-bearing capacity can be formally accommodated
into the Principal-Agent theory. But, unlike the Principal-
Agent theory, the RBC approach is concerned with where the
random shock actually eventuates on the probability distribu-
tion curve, instead of just the spread of the distribution. It is
argued that the downside shock in excess of the risk-bearing
limit should be priced differently as those situations wouldtrigger the agent's intention to opt out of the transaction and
thus cause extra cost.
Third, it is evident that use of financial instruments can raise a
project's risk-bearing capacity. Insurances are generally used to
protect against miscellaneous risk sources (e.g., all construction
risks), whilst guarantees are mostly designed for a specific type of
risk (e.g., contractor default and non-performance). As demon-
strated in Chang (2013c), the net effect of these two instruments
can be fit into the calculation of risk-bearing capacity. The third
instrument is associated with the design of termination mecha-
nism. Commercial contracts often stipulate money damages as
a mechanism of contract remedies. The compensation amount
may change one party's return from the contract and its
variations. The right to terminate the contract with cash
compensation is tantamount to granting the defaulting party
the option to buy back the contract for a strike price equal to the
compensation amount (Mahoney, 1995). In return, it is hoped
that the grantee can charge a lower risk premium to reflect lower
appropriability hazards. The desirability of providing compensa-
tion on termination should be evaluated on the cost/benefit basis.
Again, real options analysis is a useful tool for this purpose.
Whilst, as summarized in Table 3, three types of means can
be fit into the RBC framework in principle, it is useful to go
further in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the RBC
approach through a numerical example. Suppose a well-reputed
developer plans to invest in an upmarket housing project in
central London. Compared to delivery time and cost, the owner
prioritizes quality as utmost importance. To maintain the full
control of design, the owner chooses the traditional method.
Suppose, according to the owner's internal quantity surveyor,
the most likely construction cost is £50 million. It is expected
that the owner's exacting quality requirements could expose the
contractor to a significant cost overrun risk. This downside risk
(w) is a uniform variable in the range of 0 and £20 million. The
resolution of this risk would become a perverse incentive for
the contractor to shade on quality, so the investor considers
using an incentive contract to induce the contractor to work
harder towards her interest.
Following Chang (2014), apart from the forecast cost (£50 m),
the outturn cost (C) is also affected by the random shock w and
the contractor's effort at cutting cost (a):
C ¼ 50þ w−a: ð1Þ
The payment consists of two parts: target cost (£50 m)
and an incentive pay contingent upon the risk-sharing ratio
(b, −1 ≤ b ≤ 0)
P ¼ 50þ b 50−Cð Þ: ð2Þ
The contract is said to be low-powered when b = −1
(known as cost-plus contract in practice) and high-powered when
b = 0 (known as lump-sum contract). Under this incentive, the
contractor has to decide how much effort to exert by considering
the cost of effort in order to maximize the utility of the payoff
from the project (x):
U xð Þ ¼ −e−γx ð3Þ
Table 3
Three main elements of project governance and their effects on risk-bearing capacity.
Effect on risk-bearing capacity Valuation
method
Basis of evaluation
Organizational means
(choice among traditional method,
design-build, management system)
Differs in
Delivery time Using a fast-tracking procurement
system can increase the owner's risk-bearing capacity.
NPV approach Increase in project NPV owing
to early delivery
Decision rights assignment A good assignment of decision rights can increase
risk-bearing capacity through lowering adaptability costs
Econometric
estimation or
Real options
analysis
Change in adaptability costs
Frequency of transactions Would increase risk-bearing capacity and
reduce holdup-induced transaction costs
Econometric
estimation or
Real options
analysis
Monetary value of continuous
workload + change in adaptability costs
Contractual means
(contract forms)
Differs in
Risk-sharing ratio Greater risk transfer have a mixed effect
on risk-bearing capacity.
Principal-Agent
model
Additional benefit from the effort
induced – cost of risk transfer – change
in breakup loss
Financial means
Insurance Increase NPV approach Expected value of the risk impact prevented as a
result of the cover – risk premium
Guarantee Increase NPV approach Expected value of the risk impact prevented as a
result of the cover – cost of guarantee
Compensation for default Mixed Real options
analysis
Decrease in price due to compensation clauses –
cost of this compensation
Source: this research.
Fig. 1. The relationship between random cost shock and the cost borne by the
contractor.
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The owner anticipates a severe overrun risk, so requires the
contractor to purchase an insurance to protect against this risk.
To simplify, the insurance has no deductible and the insurance
premium is proportional to insurance cover (B): λB. As shown
on the solid line in Fig. 1, the contractor just needs to bear the
insurance premium if the random shock turns out to be below
the cover. In worse cases where the shock is over the cover, the
loss will be reduced by the same amount as the cover B.
A project's RBC should be evaluated on the basis of quasi
rent. In principle, the contractor has two buffers (Chang,
2013a): the contractor's markup and the potential loss resulting
from deploying sunk assets to an alternative use. To simplify,
assume that the machines and equipment used in the project are
all rented, so the second term can be ignored. Suppose, under
weak competition, it is expected that the winning contractor can
make a profit of 5 m from this project. The profit then serves
the function of the contractor's buffer. Under the incentive
contract (Eq. (2)), the contractor only bears a proportion of the
cost shock. All together, the contract may break up if
−bð Þ w−Bð Þ≥5⇒w≥ −5
b
þ B: ð4Þ
The negative sign in front of b is to ensure it is positive
because, by definition, b lies in 0 and −1. The second bracket inEq. (4) indicates the contractor's net risk exposure after
accounting for the insurance cover B.
As shown in the Appendix A, the optimal risk-risk ratio is
determined by the following equation (Eq. (A-8)):
5þ b B−Lð Þ−40b4 ¼ 0 ð5Þ
In this equation, there are two parameters: contract breakup
loss (L) and insurance cover (B). Table 4 shows the optimal
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take a low, medium or high value respectively. When the
breakup loss is held constant, a greater insurance cover will
reduce the optimal risk sharing ratio (closer to −1), meaning
that the availability of insurance products reduces the owner's
need to rely on the contractor in managing risks. By contrast,
under the same insurance cover, a large breakup cost (mostly
caused by process specificity) leads to an increase in
the likelihood of high-powered incentive contracts (b closer
to 0) being employed. Whereas offloading more risk to the
contractor could increase the expected breakup costs, it can
also yield benefit through strengthening the contractor's
incentives to cut cost (Eqs. (A-4) and (1)). Under the model
setting, the benefit from cost savings outweighs the additional
breakup cost.
From Eq. (A-8), it is evident that the RBC approach is able to
solve the two decisions in an integrated way. In the near future,
enormous new data will become available as a result of the wide
application of BIM and sensory instruments; data sources which
can improve the reliability of risk modelling. In practice, subjective
evaluation of probabilities is a common practice when historical
data are not available. The prior distribution of a parameter can be
updated on the basis of real data using Bayesian statistics (Efron,
2013). The RBC approach makes it possible to amalgamate
the fast-expanding study of big data with the design of project
governance.4. Discussions
As opposed to the existing views, the RBC approach aims
to make quantitative comments on the soundness of project
governance with the hope of opening a new frontier whereby
major procurement decisions can be integrated. As seen in the
development of a value for money assessment of PFI (Private
Finance Initiative) projects, both qualitative and quantitative
methods prove useful in decision making (HMTreasury, 2006). It
seems sensible to expect that both the qualitative and quantitative
approaches likewise have a role to play in advancing the theory of
project governance.Table 4
Optimal risk-sharing ratios for the cases with different contractor's risk attitude,
contract breakup cost and insurance cover.
Project attributes Insurance cover Optimal risk-sharing
ration (b)
Low specificity
(L = £10 m)
No cover (B = 0) −0.40
Medium cover
(B = £10 m)
−0.60
High cover (B = £20 m) −0.75
Medium specificity
(L = £15 m)
No cover (B = 0) −0.31
Medium cover
(B = £10 m)
−0.50
High cover (B = £20 m) −0.68
High specificity
(L = £20 m)
No cover (B = 0) −0.25
Medium cover (B = £10 m) −0.40
High cover (B = £20 m) −0.60
Source: this research.In the RBC framework, project governance is treated as a
mix of organizational, contractual and financial means. These
means jointly determine how much random shock a project
could withstand. With this approach, the owner can design project
governance in accordance with the expected project risk exposure
by choosing the optimal mix of three means. Currently, these
means are studied as different topics (organizational means
(project governance/delivery system/procurement route), contrac-
tual means (risk management, risk allocation), financial means
(risk management, insurance, bonding)). Breaking the false line
between these means can allow the cost/benefit of them to be
evaluated jointly and prevent over-protection (as it is too costly) or
under-protection (as it exposes the owner to too much risk).
Following the optimal choice prescribed by the RBC approach
can therefore improve the design of project governance in
efficiency terms. Secondly, the new approach can establish itself
as a positive theory for understanding project governance
practices. The key prediction is that the employment of three
means is a reflection of their relative costs. For example, as shown
in the numerical example, the insurances provided by professional
insurers and contractors can be deemed a substitute, meaning a
significant change to insurance premiums could prompt
a systematic shift to contractual risk-sharing pattern in construction
procurement.
The RBC approach can also provide assistance to procurement
decision making throughout the project lifecycle. At the stage of
contract design, the owner can use this approach to:
1. Check if the project governance suggested by the consultant
is resilient enough to withstand the predicted level of risk
exposure based on the most likely winning bid;
2. Determine the most economical use of the protection measures
for a foreseen level of risk exposure, including risk-sharing
ratio, insurance cover, performance bond and payment retention
percentage.
At the tender stage, the owner can deploy this approach to
extract unrealistic bids. In many failed projects (such as Channel
Tunnel Rail Link project and East Coast Rail Franchise contract),
the owners were actually alerted to the over-optimism of the
winning bid but no action was taken. This is probably due
to a lack of solid reasoning to act against a generous offer
that is broadly in line with the ambiguous concept of value
for money. Yet, through the lens of RBC, the danger of
accepting an unrealistic bid can be fully revealed in the form
of extra costs arising from the greater likelihood of contract
breakup.
In the operational stage, the owner can use this approach to
predict the contractor's decision on assets renewal. In projects
involving both construction and operation elements (e.g., PFI
project), the contract period normally lasts longer than 25 years,
during which the private investor is obligated to make periodic
investments to keep the assets in working conditions. However,
evidence indicates that the owner would face uncertainty at asset
renewal points (normally every 7–10 years), such as when
Metronet decided to opt out of its contract prior to the first renewal
point (National Audit Office, 2009). The RBC approach could
1203C.-Y. Chang / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 1195–1205inform the owner of the likelihood that the contractor would renew
the assets as stipulated.
The RBC approach has three insights for practitioners: first,
contract breakup potential should be explicitly recognized and
modelled in the design of project governance (because the
occurrence of breakup will result in substantial more cost);
second, the effects of organizational, contractual and financial
means on the efficiency of project governance should be
jointly considered; third, the owner can improve procurement
efficiency by seeking the optimal use of three means suggested
by the RBC approach.
The RBC approach has a close connection with Floricel and
Miller (2001). The concept of ‘cohesion’ is captured because
quasi rents measure trading parties' willingness to continue
with the transaction. The dimension of ‘resources’ is also
considered in that the RBC approach seeks to find the most
cost-effective strategy for handling risk impacts (cash reserve
mentioned in Floricel and Miller (2001) is just one of
the choices). As regards flexibility and generativity, the RBC
approach accounts for the value of options that could
strengthen the owner's flexibility and project participants'
drive to solve problems using appraisal techniques (e.g., real
options analysis). Comparatively, the RBC approach can not
only address these four dimensions, but also provide a way to
integrate them quantitatively.
5. Concluding remarks
Project governance is a relatively new concept within
project management, and the growing interest in this topic is
mostly attributable to the maturity of economic theories of
governance. Both TCE and agency theory have been
influential in prior studies of project governance. This
research submits that this line of inquiry should go further
to tap into the formalizability of these theories and develop a
quantifiable approach to project governance design. This
research draws upon the concept of risk-bearing capacity to
provide an avenue to integrate the choices of organizational
(e.g., choice of delivery system), contractual (e.g., choice of
risk-sharing ratio) and financial (e.g., choice of insurance
cover) measures that are determined independently in current
construction practice.
Compared to existing perspectives of project governance,
quantifiability is a distinguishing feature of the RBC approach.
The widespread applications of BIM will lead to project data
being more systematically stored in digital forms. An emerging
issue is how to harness these new data sources to improve
procurement decisions. In this regard, the RBC approach
provides a flexible framework to enable the study of project
governance to benefit from the fast-expanding research on
BIM and big data.
Appendix A. Derivation of the relationship between
risk-sharing ratio and insurance cover
The contractor's payoff from the project is made up of three
parts: construction cost, which is chargeable, cost of efforts(h(a)), which is not chargeable (McAfee and McMillan,
1986), and insurance premium (λB). Following the tradition of
the Principal-Agent theory, the cost of effort is assumed to be
in a quadratic form (Laffont and Martimort, 2001),
h að Þ ¼ 0:05a2: ðA 1Þ
The contractor's net payoff (x) from the project depends on
the realization of the random shock.
x ¼ P−C−h að Þ ¼ 1þ bð Þ a−wð Þ−0:05a2 ðA 2Þ
The contractor's goal is to choose a level of effort so as to
maximize his expected utility. With an insurance cover B in
place, the contractor's risk exposure is reduced to the range,
B ~ 20. Substituting Eq. (A-2) into Eq. (3) gives
maxa ‐e
−γ aþba−0:05a2−λBð Þ
Z 20
B
eγ 1þbð Þw
1
20
dw
 
: ðA 3Þ
The impacts of random shock are modelled in the second
bracket of Eq. (A-3). The first-order condition of Eq. (A-3)
yields
a ¼ 10 1þ bð Þ: ðA 4Þ
As shown in Eq. (A-2), the owner tries to transfer (1 + b)w
to the contractor. The premium for taking this risk can be
estimated by the standard formula: 1/2γσ2 (Gibbons, 2005b),
where γ is the risk-bearer's coefficient of absolute risk aversion
and σ the standard deviation of the transferred risk. To simplify
the calculation, the contractor is assumed to be risk neutral, i.e.,
γ = 0, so the contractor's surplus is
SC ¼ P−C−h að Þ: ðA 5Þ
The owner's surplus (SO) is equal to the project's market
value (V) net of the payment to the contractor
SO ¼ V−P:
For the owner, the decision question is how to choose a
risk-sharing ratio so as to maximize the total surplus (TS) of the
project:
TS ¼ SC þ SO ¼ V−C−h að Þ−λB ¼ V− 50þ w−að Þ−0:05a2−λB ðA 6Þ
where w actually eventuates will affect the total surplus yielded.
The contractor's quasi rent is £5 m. It means that, if w is over
this value, the contractor prefers to back out of the contract.
Considering the breakup threshold in Eq. (4) and the contract
breakup cost L, the expected value of the total surplus (ETS)
becomes
ETS ¼ V− 50−að Þ−
Z −5
bþB
0
w
20
dwþ L
Z 20
−5
bþB
1
20
dw−0:05a2−λB:
"
ðA 7Þ
The first-order condition of Eq. (A-7) gives
5þ b B−Lð Þ−40b4 ¼ 0: ðA 8Þ
1204 C.-Y. Chang / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 1195–1205A further elaboration of the logic and justification of this
modelling strategy can be found in Chang (2013c, 2014).
Conﬂict of interest
There is no conflict of interest.
ReferencesArrow, K.J., 1964. The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing.
Rev. Econ. Stud. 31, 91–96.
Arrunada, B., Garicano, L., Vazquez, L., 2001. Contractual allocation of decision
rights and incentives: the case of automobile distribution. J. Law Econ. Org. 17,
257–284.
Bajari, P., Houghton, S., Tadelis, S., 2014. Bidding for incomplete contracts: an
empirical analysis of adaptation costs. The American economic review 104
(4), 1288–1319.
Becht, M., Bolton, P., Röell, A., 2003. Corporate governance and control.
Handb. Econ. Financ. 1, 1–109.
Biesenthal, C., Wilden, R., 2014. Multi-level project governance: Trends and
opportunities. International Journal of Project Management 32 (8),
1291–1308.
Brynjolfsson, E., Milgrom, P., 2013. Complementarity in organizations. In:
Gibbons, R., Roberts, J. (Eds.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 11–55.
Chang, C.Y., 2012. Book review — adjudication in the building industry
(3rd edn). Constr. Manag. Econ. 30, 590–594.
Chang, C.-Y., 2013a. Understanding the hold-up problem in the management of
megaprojects: The case of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project. Int. J. Proj.
Manag. 31, 628–637.
Chang, C.-Y., 2013b. When might a project company break up? The perspective
of risk-bearing capacity. Constr. Manag. Econ. 31, 1186–1198.
Chang, C.Y., 2013c. Critiques of the existing techniques for the evaluation of
renewable energy projects. Int. J. Proj. Manag. 31, 1057–1067.
Chang, C.Y., 2014. Principal-agent model of risk allocation in construction
contracts and its critique. ASCE J. Constr. Eng. Manag. 140, 04013032.
Chang, C.Y., Chou, H.Y., 2014. Transaction-cost approach to the comparative
analysis of user-Pay and government-pay public-private partnership systems.
ASCE J. Constr. Eng. Manag. 04014039.
Chang, C.Y., Ive, G., 2007. Reversal of bargaining power in construction projects:
meaning, existence and implications. Constr. Manag. Econ. 25, 845–855.
Dixit, A., 2009. Governance institutions and economic activity. Am. Econ. Rev. 99,
5–24.
Durisin, B., Puzone, F., 2009. Maturation of corporate governance research,
1993–2007: an assessment. Corp. Gov. 17, 266–291.
Eells, R.S.F., 1960. The Meaning of Modern Business: An Introduction to
the Philosophy of Large Corporate Enterprise. Columbia University Press, New
York.
Efron, B., 2013. A 250-year argument: belief, behavior, and the bootstrap. Bull.
Am. Math. Soc. 50, 129–146.
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. J. Law
Econ. 26, 301–325.
Floricel, S., Miller, R., 2001. Strategizing for anticipated risks and turbulence in
large-scale engineering projects. Int. J. Proj. Manag. 19, 445–455.
Gibbons, R., 2005a. Four formal (izable) theories of the firm? J. Econ. Behav.
Organ. 58, 200–245.
Gibbons, R., 2005b. Incentives between firms (and within). Manag. Sci. 50, 2–17.
Hart, O., 1995. Corporate governance: some theory and implications. Econ. J.
105, 678–689.
Hart, O., Holmstrom, B., 1987. The theory of contracts. In: Bewley, T.F. (Ed.),
Advances in Economic Theory. Fifth World Congress of the Econometric
Society, pp. 71–155.
Hart, O., Holmstrom, B., 2010. A theory of firm scope. Q. J. Econ. 125, 483–513.
Hermalin, B.E., 2013. Corporate governance. In: Gibbons, R., Roberts, J. (Eds.),
Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, pp. 732–763.Hillebrandt, P., Hughes, W., Murdoch, J., 2002. Financial Protection in the UK
Building Industry: Bonds, Retentions and Guarantees. Taylor & Francis.
Infrastructure UK, 2013. Improving Infrastructure Delivery: Alliancing Best
Practice in Infrastructure Delivery. HMSO, London.
Ive, G., Chang, C.Y., 2007. The principle of inconsistent trinity in the selection
of procurement systems. Constr. Manag. Econ 25, 677–690.
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financ. Econ. 3, 305–360.
John, K., Senbet, L.W., 1998. Corporate governance and board effectiveness.
J. Bank. Financ. 22, 371–403.
Joskow, P.L., 1985. Vertical integration and long-term contracts: the case of
coal-burning electric generating plants. J. Law Econ. Org. 1, 33.
Joskow, P.L., 1988. Price adjustment in long-term contracts: the case of coal.
J. Law Econ. 31, 47–83.
Klein, B., 1996. Why hold‐ups occur: the self‐enforcing range of contractual
relationships. Econ. Inq. 34, 444–463.
Klein, B., Crawford, R.G., Alchian, A.A., 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable
rents, and the competitive contracting process. J. Law Econ. 21, 297–326.
Laffont, J.J., Martimort, D., 2001. The theory of Incentives: The Principal-
Agent Model. Princeton University Press.
Latham, M., 1994. Constructing the Team: Final Report of the Government/
Industry Review of Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in the UK
Construction Industry. The Stationery Office, London.
Mahoney, P.G., 1995. Contract remedies and options pricing. J. Leg. Stud. 24,
139–163.
McAfee, R.P., McMillan, J., 1986. Bidding for contracts: a principal-agent
analysis. Rand J. Econ. 17, 326–338.
Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1992. Economics, Organization and Management.
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Müller, R., 2009. Project Governance. Gower Publishing.
Müller, R., 2010. Project governance. In: Morris, P.W., Pinto, J.K., Söderlund,
J. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Project Management. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Müller, R., Turner, J.R., 2005. The impact of principal-agent relationship and
contract type on communication between project owner and manager. Int.
J. Proj. Manag. 23, 398–403.
National Audit Office, 2009. The Failure of Metronet. HMSO, London.
Office of Government Commerce, 2007. Whole-life Costing and Cost
Management: Achieving Excellence in Construction Procurement Guide
No.7. OGC, London.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development, 2004. OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance 2004. OECD Publishing.
Pratt, J.W., 1964. Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica 32,
122–136.
RICS, 2012. NRM 2 — Detailed Measurement for Building Works. Royal
Institute of Chartered Surveyors, London.
Rivkin, J.W., 2000. Imitation of complex strategies. Manag. Sci. 46, 824–844.
Roberts, J., 2007. The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance
and Growth. OUP, Oxford.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Financ. 52,
737–783.
Smith, N.J., Merna, T., Jobling, P., 2006. Managing Risk in Construction Projects.
Wiley.
Söderlund, J., 2004. Building theories of project management: past research,
questions for the future. Int. J. Proj. Manag. 22, 183–191.
Tadelis, S., 2012. Public procurement design: lessons from the private sector.
Int. J. Ind. Organ. 30, 297–302.
Telser, L.G., 1980. A theory of self-enforcing agreements. J. Bus. 27–44.
Tirole, J., 2001. Corporate governance. Econometrica 69, 1–35.
Treasury, H.M., 2006. Value for Money Assessment Guidance. HMSO, London.
Treasury, H.M., 2007. Project Governance: A Guidance Note for Public Sector
Projects. The Stationery Office, London.
Treasury, H.M., 2013. Standardisation of PF2 Contracts. HMSO, London.
Turner, R., 2009. Handbook of Project-Based Management, 4/e. McGraw-Hill,
London.
van den Hurk, M., Verhoest, K., 2015. The governance of public -private
partnerships in sports infrastructure: Interfering complexities in Belgium.
International Journal of Project Management 33 (1), 201–211.
1205C.-Y. Chang / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 1195–1205Williamson, O.E., 1991. Comparative economic organization: the analysis of
discrete structural alternatives. Adm. Sci. Q. 36, 269–296.
Williamson, O.E., 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University
Press, USA.
Winch, G.M., 2001. Governing the project process: a conceptual framework.
Constr. Manag. Econ. 19, 799–808.Winch, G.M., 2014. Three domains of project organising. Int. J. Proj. Manag.
32, 721–731.
Zingales, L., 1998. Corporate Governance, The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law. Macmillan, London, pp. 497–502.
